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"Reading for Life": 1 Martha C. Nussbaum 
on Philosophy and Literature 
RICHARD ELDRIDGE 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy 
and Literature. (Oxford University Press, 1990), xix + 403 
pages, $42.50. 
WHAT is it to understand something? According 
to the modern extensionalist view of the world, to understand 
an object is to know its measurable properties, such as its mass, 
location, and velocity. Knowledge of these properties of an 
object furnishes us with knowledge of possibilities for manipu-
lating it. Within this modern view, the paradigm form for the 
expression of understanding is the scientific report or treatise, 
which lists the procedures employed for obtaining measure-
ments, the measurements so obtained, and the possibilities for 
interaction with other objects that the measured object is thus 
known to possess. 
The philosophical theory of this form of understanding in 
turn naturally models itself on its scientific object. A measure or 
criterion is sought for when understanding has measured its 
objects correctly. In this way, the treatise on the proper employ-
ment of the understanding becomes the central textual form of 
modern philosophy. 
When moral philosophy is done within this paradigm, it natu-
rally focuses on the measurement of human action. Having thus 
understood physical objects and the understanding itself, it then 
becomes natural to ask "What will persons do in such and such 
circumstances?" The most thoroughly developed modern scien-
tific forms for the understanding of persons all share in this 
effort to measure the determinants of action. This effort is the 
common thread linking such otherwise divergent research 
programs as behaviorist psychology, cognitivist psychology, 
economic revealed preference theory, game theory, and disposi-
tional personality theory. These enterprises all seek neutral, 
detached control of their object, the human person. 
Martha Nussbaum is not pursuing this form of the under-
standing of persons. Instead, the sort of human understanding 
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that she pursues "does not even attempt to approach the world 
as it might be in itself, uninterpreted, unhumanized. Its raw 
material is the history of human social experience, which is 
already an interpretation and a measure" (164). Her reasons for 
rejecting the modern paradigm for the understanding of persons 
and preferring instead the textures of understandings to be 
found in novels and other narratives include such thoughts as 
these. There is no stably measurable and controllable object 
there. A human life- any human life-is instead a shifting mix-
ture of envisionings of ideals, responses to historical inheri-
tances of possibilities of action and expression, and promptings 
of unruly desire. It displays historically and biologically con-
strained exercises-courageous or cowardly, moving or repul-
sive, vicious or virtuous as may be - of self-responsible self-
creation. Measurement can investigate some of the historical 
and biological constraints on these exercises, and it can some-
times usefully suggest therapies involving the alterations of these 
constraints through behavioral modification or drugs. But meas-
urement cannot capture the courage or creativity or love that 
human beings sometimes display in response to the conditions 
that constrain their action. And since similar courage or creativ-
ity or love are likewise possibilities for us, we who reflect on the 
actions and lives of others, the serious investigator of human 
action is not external to her object. She is called upon to love or 
to reject it, discovering in it either revelations or denigrations of 
her own best possibilities of human life. 
Love's Knowledge is the record of Martha Nussbaum's loves 
for and disappointments with some major texts that claim to 
describe and to embody human wisdom. Nussbaum's attention 
in these essays- most of them published previously between 
1983 and 1990 to wide notice- ranges across the texts of Plato 
and Aristotle in philosophy, of Homer, Dickens, Proust, Beck-
ett, Beattie, and above all Henry James in narrative literature, 
and of Stanley Fish and Wayne C. Booth in literary theory, with 
brief glances at numerous related figures. Always she is con-
. cerned to ask: How do the writers and the characters who are 
their various imaginative vehicles love? In what friendships, 
activities, and forms of self-understanding do they place their 
energies and trusts, and with what results? How am l to learn 
from and against them to inhabit my own friendships, assume 
my own ways of being, and develop my own self-understand-
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ings? How am I, as a human being subject to various forces and 
constraints, and open to various narrative possibilities, to live 
well? 
Among the forces and constraints in play in a human life, 
Nussbaum mentions such things as these. There are historical 
inheritances of complex forms of personal expression and 
action. Maggie Verver and Strether, for example, are Americans 
of quite particular gender, class, geographic, and family back-
grounds. The Prince, and Marcel, and David Copperfield are 
Italian, and French, and English. While each of these figures evi-
dences capabilities of self-transformation in moving in some 
measure away from the forms of expression they have inherited, 
their characters are also evident not only or principally in the 
new expressions at which they arrive, but also and more deeply 
in the trajectories of their developments from their particular 
pasts to their particular presents. (It is for this reason that Aris-
totle ranks the plot which traces these developments and the 
character that is therein revealed - and not language or imagery 
or diction - as the most important elements of serious narrative 
investigations of human action, and Nussbaum as a reader joins 
him in this thought.) 
Second, there are facts of desire. David Copperfield's attracti-
ons to Steerforth and to Dora, Marcel's passion for Albertine, 
and Chad's sexual love for Marie de Vionnet all testify to a 
human susceptibility to being moved by a particular other. 
Parents and children likewise play highly particularized roles as 
objects of central concern and relationship for us. Expressing 
and sustaining such passions or coping with their refusal are 
central shaping activities of human lives. It is not clear how the 
promptings of these passions are to be reconciled to either the 
possibilities of expression that these characters find historically 
available or to the demands of a more impersonal morality. 
There is something, Nussbaum finds, of the private and inarticu-
lable about them (351-52), and she confesses to some unsure-
ness about how to balance the claims of passion and particularity 
against those of morality and generality (50-53). Yet there 
they are. 
Third, there are ideals. Human beings are not prisoners of 
their histories and biologies. They have capacities of imagina-
tion and reflection that free them from full control by their con-
straints. Hence ideal but currently unavailable possibilities of 
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life can guide our responses to the imperfect situations that we 
confront: "'unavailable' does not imply 'irrelevant'" (64). 
Fourth, there is luck. What Nussbaum calls "uncontrollable 
happenings" matter. Whether one's child dies, whether one's 
former lover happens to be at home to receive a telephone call 
during a brief visit to New York, whether the object of one's pas-
sion has the sensibility and aspirations to return it, whether the 
social world makes possible forms of action that enable the 
expression of human personality-these kinds of happenings 
and states of affairs shape the lives of human agents attempting 
to realize their best human possibilities. 
Finally, in blending all of these - history with biology with 
ideality, national, class, and geographic character with particu-
lar passion with justice, everywhere under the influence of 
luck-there are still facts of human character: courage and cre-
ativity and love, or their refusals. 
It is obtuse to deny the roles of these constraints and forces 
in shaping a human life. Or perhaps, Nussbaum suggests, prin-
cipally through a· magnificent reading of Plato's Protagoras, 
such a denial- indulged in by utilitarians, rational preference 
theorists, behaviorists, and other measurers of value - is a pos-
sible human act of intellectual desperation and self-mutilation. 
Better or easier, some think, to have a univocal measure of value 
than to acknowledge the salience in human life of incommensu-
rable forces and constraints along with the risks and responsibil-
ities that such forces and awareness of them bring. Nothing, as 
Stanley Cavell has insisted, is more human than to deny the 
human.2 
Once we see human lives as courageous or cowardly, creative 
or routine, loving or narcissistic responses to such constraints 
and forces, then the treatise, the favored form of philosophical 
expression in modernity, immediately becomes less attractive as 
a vehicle of human understanding of human possibilities. 
Instead it will be "texts that narrate the experiences of beings 
committed to value" (149), novels and perhaps related historical 
and biographical works of sustained narration, that will have the 
most to show us about how we might best live in response to our 
constraints and to the incommensurability of goods. "It is only 
by following a pattern of choice and commitment over a rela-
tively long period of time - as the novel characteristically does -
that we can understand the pervasiveness of ... conflicts [among 
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qualitatively different actions or commitments, when ... one 
cannot pursue both] in human efforts to live well" (37). Novels 
and their kin, not treatises, are the central texts of psychegogia, 
of the soul's education. It is through our emotional reactions-
aversion, fearfulness, sympathy, grief, awe, love, reverence, or 
boredom as may be - to narratives that we learn the best possi-
bilities of human life and the best paths toward them that vari-
ous contexts make available. 
This account of our responses to novels and other sustained 
narratives in one way resembles what has come to be called New 
Historicism. Adopting a phrase from Henry James, Nussbaum is 
happy along with critics inspired by a blend of Marx and Fou-
cault to speak of a "projected morality" of either an individual 
text or a genre (10). Both individual texts and whole genres 
induce in their readers responses to historical phenomena that 
are typical perhaps of certain social classes. Greek tragedy in 
general and Sophocles in particular induce in readers with cer-
tain sensibilities and interests a sense of awe at and identification 
with those who seek to transcend natural limitations, coupled 
with a sense of relief or appropriateness at their ultimate down-
fall. The modern novel, with James and Proust as its supreme 
practitioners, induces in certain readers an identification with 
those undergoing the vicissitudes of individual character forma-
tion and a sense of shared triumph with those who successfully 
discover or create their personalities, becoming individuals 
against a background of social convention. It is surely right, as 
New Historicists have insisted, to locate our interest in and 
responsiveness to the modern novel as in part a function of the 
rise of a modern society, in which more scope is given to the 
development of certain sorts of individual personality than was 
typical in feudal economies. 
But there is also a central difference between Nussbaum and 
the New Historicists. Where New Historicists are typically 
interested in explaining both our responses to individual works 
and the rises and falls of whole genres as functions of the inde-
pendent emergence and attenuation of certain forms of social 
life, Nussbaum in contrast regards the texts in which she is inter-
ested as tracings of possibilities that are not external to us. For 
her, we face the same problems of human life-of choosing 
between static harmony or a life lived in awareness of death and 
loss, or between patient domesticity and reckless adventurism, 
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or between intimacy and public egalitarianism - that have been 
faced by Odysseus and Maggie Verver, by Hyacinth Robinson 
and Marcel. 
It is this sense of our having something to learn from the 
particularities of novels in which standing human problems are 
canvassed that separates Nussbaum from both New Historicists 
and more traditional ethical theorists. Unlike New Historicists, 
postmodernists, social constructionists, and their kin, she 
retains "a deep commitment to getting somewhere" rather than 
resting content simply to "stop with an enumeration of differ-
ences and with the verdict that we cannot fairly compare, 
cannot rationally decide" (28). Unlike modern philosophical 
theorists of reason-sanctioned more or less algorithmic rules 
and principles, where incommensurabilities are denied in the 
interest of hewing to action-guiding calculations, she holds that 
there is no more direct route to a reasonable understanding of 
what it is for a human being to live well than working through 
our various emotional responses to various sustained narratives 
of quite different drifts. Deliberation, according to Nussbaum, 
need not be and at bottom isn't "either quantitative or a mere 
shot in the dark" ( 60). It involves instead "'getting the tip'" from 
cases, wherein "progress comes not from the teaching of an 
abstract law but by leading the friend, or child, or loved one - by 
a word, by a story, by an image -to see some new aspect of the 
concrete case at hand, to see it as this or that" (160). The genre 
of philosophical criticism of the novel of which she is our most 
eminent current practitioner involves taking up these tips from 
various cases, setting them "side by side," both interrogating 
and letting oneself learn from manifold stories at hand and our 
complex, powerful, and ambivalent responses to them. I cannot 
think of any better way, any way more faithful to the reversals 
and triumphs of human life, in which to do moral philosophy 
than this. 
Nonetheless there are, as there always are, certain themes in 
Love's Knowledge that are for me regions of concern. I will men-
tion two. 
The first is that in holding that the possibilities of contextual 
human development that are displayed in the careers of the pro-
tagonists of the novels she surveys are not external to us, Nuss-
baum is committed further to holding that there are at some 
level certain perennial problems of human life. But what are 
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these problems? I am inclined to wish for more articulation of 
them, perhaps along a slightly different line from the one Nuss-
baum takes. It is useful here to compare her sense of the persis-
tent problems of human life with Kant's. In the Critique of 
Judgement Kant writes that "the concept of freedom is meant to 
actualize in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws."3 
(Passages like this lead me to think, by the way, that it is a mis-
take on Nussbaum's part to regard "What is my moral duty?" as 
"Kant's organizing question" in moral philosophy [24].) This 
passage says, among other things, that we are not as agents con-
tent to rest with an empty or unrealized freedom, but instead 
seek to express our free personality in the world in such a way 
that it receives ratification or recognition, and we seek further to 
discover whether and how the natural and social worlds might 
support this ambition. One way to read novels and other sus-
tained narratives is then to see their protagonists as concerned 
with the enduring problem of expressing and winning ratifica-
tion for their free personality, against the obstacles to doing this 
that the natural and social worlds variously throw up at various 
times and places. 4 Insofar as all human beings have this aim of 
expressing their free personality, and insofar as certain protago-
nists develop powerful strategies in context for winning 
through to better forms of expression than are typical in their 
times and places, we then have something to learn from these 
protagonists. 
In place of this sort of Kantian account of the enduring prob-
lems of humanity, Nussbaum instead offers us largely reformu-
lations and revisions of Aristotle's remarks on eudaimonia. 
"The general answer to [the] question ['How should a human 
being live?'] suggested by Aristotle himself is, 'In accordance 
with all the forms of good functioning that make up a complete 
human life.' The notion of good human functioning steers and 
guides the inquiry at a deep level, focusing attention on certain 
features of situations rather than others" (95). In contrast with a 
Kantian view, this sense of the problems faced by human beings 
seems to me both to overspecify and to underspecify our situa-
tion. The problems of human life are here overspecified to the 
extent that the paradigms of good human functioning are drawn 
from relatively narrow ranges, say from the most impressive 
exemplars of the Greek aristocracy, or from intellectual life 
only, or from the Jamesian world of the salon, or from the 
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thought that good human functioning requires centrally the sat-
isfaction of biological needs, such as those for food and clothing. 
In each case, the successes in good human functioning that are 
then canvassed seem too specific to certain historical epochs or 
class configurations, and canvassing all of them together leaves 
us less with a way of appreciating and integrating all these suc-
cesses, as Nussbaum surely and rightly wishes it to, than it does 
a hodgepodge. For all her insistence on the internal or anthropo-
centric objectivity of morality, in a way her procedure here 
leaves her perhaps a bit too open to appropriation by New His-
toricists, who will see in all these divergent exemplars just the 
projected but subjective moralities of various irreconcilable 
interest groups. 
Good human functioning is left underspecified to the extent 
that the problems and interests that these divergent exemplars 
share are relatively unarticulated. There are in Love's Knowledge 
few paradigms of reconciliation among members of divergent 
groups in the emergence of a shared commitment to equal jus-
tice, conceived as the equal chance for expressing free human 
personality and having its expression supported and ratified. 
"Politics is about using human intelligence to support human 
neediness," where among our needs Nussbaum lists such things 
as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education for children, 
and property (373). Absent from this list is something like an 
aspiration or need for a culture of political justice or equal free-
dom. There is perhaps something characteristically Greek, as 
opposed to Christian, in this emphasis. Nussbaum seems to me 
sometimes to value in her heroines such qualities as courage, 
integrity, gaiety, and improvisatory alertness at the expense of 
such qualities as fairness, reciprocity, and concern for equality. 
This tendency is perhaps reflected in her response to David Cop-
perfield where she rightly praises David's interest in Dora rather 
than Agnes as part of his openness to the emotions, the private, 
and the inarticulable, but in this praise fails to see, I think, how 
uncomfortable both David and Dickens are with Dora, with an 
attachment in which genuine reciprocity and human equality 
are not possible (in part as a result of Dora's familial and cultural 
background). 
I have little doubt that on most substantive questions of pol-
itical judgment Nussbaum and I would be in fairly close 
agreement. She is clearly concerned with political justice and 
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reasonable economic equality. She believes in these things. But 
her protagonists do not show us much about how to integrate a 
commitment to these ideals with their other commitments, or to 
do better in doing this than those around them do, and the result 
is that we get almost a laundry list of commitments that make 
for good human functioning. To some extent the readings Nuss-
baum gives of extended narratives, particularly of The Princess 
Cassamassima, take up these issues and develop a richer and yet 
more universally shared conception of the problems faced by 
human agents than is afforded by the Aristotelian background. 
Perhaps her revisions of Aristotle and mine of Kant do not end 
up in very different places. But perhaps also Kant's thoughts 
about human agents and the problem of free personality would 
be of some help here. 
The second region of concern revolves around the question 
"What is really doing the work in moving us toward Nuss-
baum's vision of the human person and its prospects?" In partic-
ular, is the effective, conviction-inducing structure of her 
writing more that of an intellectual autobiography, a narrative 
of the evolution of her concerns, or that of a comparative theo-
retical study? There is no doubt that it is in places each of these 
things. In various places, bits of autobiographical reflection 
break out. She was, she tells us, an impassioned young reader, 
alive with sympathies for the moral dramas of the great novels 
and tragedies. She was both committed to the powers of system-
atic reason and brought up short by the various rigidities of 
thought of academic moral philosophy and classics and litera-
ture. She has managed through her writing somehow to make 
herself whole. This is quite a story, particularly for those who 
had childhoods and graduate school experiences resembling 
hers. At the same time, Nussbaum in places writes as a theorist 
of our practical concerns, comparing and contrasting and adju-
dicating among the accounts of our concerns that are put for-
ward in various literary and philosophical texts that serve as 
inputs to be scrutinized by the theoretical consciousness (cf. 
p. 290). Here the result- an elaboration or theory or account of 
our human concerns - is achieved less through an odyssey or 
narratable course of progress than it is through an almost time-
less act of judgment among alternatives. One of her deepest 
hopes, I think, is in the end to reject these questions - is her 
writing narrative or theory? is it autobiography or moral analy-
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sis? - and instead to produce a new mixed genre, one that lies 
between and partakes of the strengths of both narrative and the-
oretical prose. She seeks instead a style that is "non-reductive, 
and also self-conscious about its own lack of completeness, ges-
turing toward experience and toward the literary texts" but also 
a style that canvasses "the distinctive features of novels in a way 
that contrasts them with features of other conceptions" (49). 
Perhaps the central question to ask in coming to terms with this 
effort is "What happens in the reader's moments of sympathetic 
engagement with and openness to learning from it?" Is it that 
the reader judges the analysis worthwhile according to some 
implicit and intellectually articulable criterion of worth, moral 
or aesthetic or both together? Or is it that the reader instead 
finds herself in the course of her progress already engaged and 
sympathetic-in love with the text one might call it-before 
comparative analysis gets going? It may be, I think, that it is 
more the latter, and that this fact has consequences for the 
appropriate character of texts of the most serious human wis-
dom, pushing them even more toward the narrative and novelis-
tic than Nussbaum's mixed genre. One might ask, "Can 
philosophy become literature and still know itself?"5 
In a wonderful reading of an Ann Beattie short story, Nuss-
baum herself describes the process of acquiring love's knowl-
edge, where this includes both knowledge of what love is and the 
knowledge that is involved in being in love. "Knowledge of love 
is not a state or function of the solitary person at all, but a com-
plex way of being, feeling, and interacting with another person" 
(274). Entering into this way of being involves deliberately not 
insisting on criteria of judgment, but instead a willingness and 
ability to "stop stopping" what will happen (278), the simulta-
neous discovery and creation of newly actualized possibilities of 
human value. "Reading a story is like that" (280). And if it is, 
and if reading stories is central to entering into valuable ways of 
being, and if entering into these ways of being is fundamental in 
a well-led human life, then stopping stopping what will happen 
is likewise fundamental to acquiring and enacting human wis-
dom. This is not the image of wisdom and its acquisition that is 
central in modern philosophy. But I did not want Love's Knowl-
edge to stop, and I find myself trusting its progress as much as 
that of any work of moral thinking of recent times. 
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NOTES 
A shortened version of these comments ( originally presented before the Ameri-
can Society for Aesthetics, November 1991) will appear in Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research, Volume 52, number 2 Oune 1992). 
1. This title quotes the title of the ninth essay of Nussbaum's collection, on 
Dickens, itself a near quotation of a remark of David Copperfield's about his own 
boyhood habits of reading. All further references to Love's Knowledge will be 
given in the text in page numbers in parentheses. 
2. See Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason (Oxford University Press, 1979), 
pp. 109,207. 
3. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. J.C. Meredith (Oxford 
University Press, 1928), p. 14. 
4. I take up this way of reading in On Moral Personhood: Philosophy, Litera-
ture, Criticism and Self-Understanding (University of Chicago Press, 1989). For 
related readings of Victorian novelists from Dickens to Joyce, see Philip M. 
Weinstein, The Semantics of Desire (Princeton University Press, 1984). 
5. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 496. 
